

TRANSMITTAL AND DOCUMENT RECEIPT

Approved For Release 2005/07/14 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002700090067-1

TO: Mr. Hal Ford
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

FROM: Office of Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Room 7 D 35
Washington, D.C. 20505

THE DOCUMENTS LISTED HEREON ARE FORWARDED FOR:

INFORMATION	ACTION	XX	RETENTION	LOAN	
CONTROL NUMBER	DOC. DATE	SUBJECT (Unclassified preferred)			CLASS.
77-5596/A		3 memorandums and 10 cables related to the Frank Snepp allegations on Vietnam <i>Vietnam</i>			S

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FORM 3772B
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Considerations in Saigon in April 1975 on the
Feasibility of a Political Settlement

1. While the Vietnam Station and the Defense Attache Intelligence Division concluded before the end of the third week of March 1975 that South Vietnam has lost the war and that an early collapse was unavoidable in the absence of meaningful U.S. intervention, a number of informed political observers have felt that Hanoi may wish to consider the option of a so-called political solution. It will be recalled that COSVN's Resolution for 1975 defined the objective of the upcoming offensive, inter alia, "to force the GVN to negotiate a political settlement from a militarily weakened position", that Lao Dong Party First Secretary Le Duan in early February stated that "those who maintain that a military solution is the only possible way to bring about reunification have not drawn the proper conclusions from North Vietnam's history" and that as recently as mid-April Vietnamese communist propaganda spoke of the proper implementation of the Paris Agreements. The theoretical validity of the political solution based on what the Hungarians called "socialist logic" was specifically recognized also in the final report of the Weyand Mission which departed Saigon on 4 April.

2. There were no illusions in the American Embassy in Saigon about the nature of a political solution, given the hard realities of the military situation. After the fall of Military Regions One and Two, the war could end only on Hanoi's terms but there were some tenuous reasons on basis of which one could conclude or at least hope for the possibility that Hanoi might be content with a solution similar to that of a Vichy-France. At any rate, the alternative to such a development justified--in our opinion--any effort which might help to bring about a conclusion, however temporary, short of total military subjugation.

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... because the political guidance had not caught up with the startling progress of the North Vietnamese, during the first half of April the various communist media and also PRG Foreign Minister Madame Binh continued to talk about the Paris Agreement, the need for a three-party coalition in Saigon and about the proper implementation of the Paris Agreement, particularly with respect to Chapters 1, 4 and 9. The reputedly well-informed Agence France Press correspondent in Hanoi, Thoraval, claimed as late as 28 March that the North Vietnamese objectives remained limited although he said that Hanoi was hardening its stand against negotiations with Thieu. The PRG spokesman in Tan Son Nhut, Colonel Giang, in contact with Malcolm Brown of the New York Times, held open the possibility of a political solution till about 27 April when he registered dissatisfaction with "Big" Minh's sentiments, which, he said, "were not responsive to the PRG's demands."

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